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The discrete variables (DV) time-frequency (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is a BB84 like protocol, 
which utilizes time and frequency as complementary bases. As orthogonal modulations, pulse position modulation 
(PPM) and frequency shift keying (FSK) are capable of transmitting several bits per symbol, i.e. per photon. 
However, unlike traditional binary polarization shift keying, PPM and FSK do not allow perfectly complementary 
bases. So information is not completely deleted when the wrong-basis filters are applied. Since a general security 
proof does not yet exist, we numerically assess DV-TF-QKD. We show that the secret key rate increases with a 
higher number of symbols per basis. Further we identify the optimal pulse relations in the two bases in terms of key 
rate and resistance against eavesdropping attacks. 
1 Introduction 
Quantum key distribution (QKD), the first applicable 
quantum technology, is used to distribute a secret key 
to two parties, which can then for example be used as 
a one-time pad for absolute secure communication. In 
the conventional implementation of the BB84 
protocol for QKD either polarization or phase of 
single photons is used to form the two required non-
orthogonal bases [1-3]. Yet, in various scenarios 
modulation of polarization or phase may not be 
practicable. For example for satellite communications 
polarization is usually set to left- or right-handed 
circular [4, 5]. Here we investigate a BB84-like 
protocol where information is coded either via time or 
via frequency modulations. More specifically pulse 
position modulation (PPM) and frequency shift 
keying (FSK) are used to form the two required 
complementary bases. This protocol, namely the 
time-frequency (TF)-QKD protocol is promising, 
because PPM and FSK rely on techniques in classical 
communication, which makes this protocol easier to 
implement in existing systems and networks. 
The TF-QKD protocol was suggested by several 
authors [6, 7]. The security of embodiments of 
continuous variable (CV)-TF-QKD was addressed [8-
12] while a security proof against general attacks for 
discrete variables (DV) is not yet at hand. DV 
implementations using prepare-and-measure [13] or 
entanglement [14] were reported. Recently 
DV-TF-QKD was addressed with respect to a certain 
intercept/resend attack [15] and turbulent free-space 
channels [16]. 
The main conceptual difference between DV-TF-
QKD and BB84 is the imperfect complementarity of 
the measurement bases of DV-TF-QKD. In BB84, 
getting all information coded in one basis completely 
deletes the information coded in the other. However, 
in DV-TF-QKD not all information is deleted. 
In [15] the performance of prepare-and-measure DV-
TF-QKD is investigated. There, narrow pulses 
compared to bin width and pulse separation are 
assumed. Using narrow pulses was proposed in [12] 
for CV-, not DV-TF-QKD. In [15] the protocol 
performance was calculated based on a variation of 
the intercept/resend attack where the gaps between 
the pulses are exploited by an eavesdropper to 
distinguish the bases. In CV-TF-QKD narrow pulses 
are preferable since there are no gaps and both bases 
can be made indistinguishable [12]. However, this is 
not the case for DV-TF-QKD, thus narrow pulses 
might not be the optimal choice here. 
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In this paper we show that a larger overlap of the 
pulses although leading to more errors in the raw key 
can be preferable over narrow pulses. After 
introducing the basics of the protocol we will 
investigate how the widths of the symbol-pulses 
affect the secret key rate of DV-TF-QKD. We will 
also find the optimal pulse width of the conjugated 
pulses. Further, we will calculate the number of secret 
bits per photon for the optimal pulse width and show 
that a higher number of possible symbols per basis 
increases the secret key rate regarding an 
intercept/resend attack exploiting the unique 
probabilities of DV-TF-QKD. 
2 The time-frequency protocol 
In DV-TF-QKD like in BB84 single photons coded in 
two bases are used to distribute a secret key between 
sender Alice and receiver Bob hidden from an 
eavesdropper Eve. Alice and Bob choose their 
sending/measurement basis randomly and afterwards 
discard all measurement results where their bases 
differ. This is called sifting. Then they compare a 
small fraction of the resulting sifted key which they 
discard afterwards to measure the quantum symbol 
error rate (QSER) and conclude on Eve’s knowledge 
of the key. If Eve’s knowledge is low enough, it is 
possible to distill a secret key using error correction 
and privacy amplification, otherwise the QKD 
process needs to be repeated. 
2.1 Pulse relationships 
The modulations used as the two bases are M-PPM 
and M-FSK as shown in Fig. 1. Here M symbol pulses 
in M different time (resp. frequency) bins represent M 
different symbols. In the conjugate basis, i.e. 
frequency for time pulses and vice versa, the 
conjugate pulses spread out over all bins and thus 
contain no information. Because each pulse contains 
exactly one photon, the pulse energy densities 
represent the probability distributions to measure the 
photon in a certain point in time (resp. frequency). 
Without loss of generality we assume Fourier-limited 
Gaussian pulses. Each symbol can contain up to 
N = log2(M) raw bits, i.e. one qu-N-it. In Fig. 1 shows 
the energy densities for M = 4. 
 
Fig. 1: (Color online) PPM- and FSK-symbol and 
conjugated pulses in the time and frequency domain for 
M = 4.  
σt (resp. σω) is half the 1/e width of the energy density 
of a PPM (resp. FSK) symbol pulse and ∆t (resp. ∆ω) 
is the symbol pulse separation. The central frequency 
(resp. time) of the conjugated PPM (resp. FSK) pulses 
is chosen such that they are centered with respect to 
the FSK (resp. PPM) symbol pulses in the frequency 
(resp. time) domain. The 1/e widths of the symbol 
pulses and conjugate pulses are reciprocal. The pulse 
energy density is given by 
 ( ) ( )
2 2
2
z
z zσ σρ ψ φσ σ
 ≡ ≡  
 
. (1) 
Here φ(z) = 1/(2π)1/2 exp{-z2/2} is the standard normal 
distribution, σ is equal to σt (resp. σω) for the PPM 
(resp. FSK) symbol pulse and σω
-1
 (resp. σt
-1) for the 
conjugated FSK (resp. PPM) pulse. Furthermore z = t 
for time (resp. z = ω for frequency) pulses.  
In BB84 it is impossible to reveal any information of 
the basis by a measurement. As pointed out in [12] in 
CV-TF-QKD narrow symbol pulses are preferable 
because hereby it is possible to make the symbol 
pulses indistinguishable from a conjugated pulses of 
the complementary basis. This means in the 
frequency (resp. time) domain all FSK (resp. PPM) 
symbol pulses can perfectly overlap with all 
conjugate PPM (resp. FSK) pulses when the symbol 
pulses rate is varied over the frequency (resp. time) 
accordingly. In DV-TF-QKD this is not possible for 
both bases. However, with optimized pulse widths of 
symbol and conjugated pulses the overlap can be 
improved significantly.  
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Additionally for BB84 the measurement in the wrong 
basis deletes all information in the other (correct) 
basis. However, in the TF-protocol it is possible to 
extract information on the encoded qu-N-it even if it 
is already filtered in the wrong basis. For example 
Eve could accomplish this by guiding the photons 
through two successive time and frequency filters. To 
hinder this approach the first filtering process should 
make the outcome of the second perfectly random. 
That means its time distribution should be 
significantly broadened by projection on any FSK 
symbol. In DV-TF-QKD this condition cannot be 
achieved perfectly. 
Both, perfect overlap and information-deletion, can 
be approached by applying the following pulse 
relations: 
i. ∆t ≈ 2σt : the 1/e width of the PPM symbol 
pulses is similar to the pulse distance, 
ii. ∆ω ≈ 2σω  : the 1/e width of the narrow FSK 
symbol pulses is similar to the pulse 
distance, 
iii. 2σt
−1 
≈ M∆ω : the conjugated PPM pulse is 
approximately as wide as the M FSK symbol 
pulses, 
iv. 2σω
−1 
≈ M∆t : the conjugated FSK pulse is 
approximately as wide as the M PPM symbol 
pulses. 
To extend these approximations to quantitative 
equalities we define the normalized pulse widths 
 
2 2
t
t
ωσ σα
ω
≡ =
∆ ∆  
(2) 
and 
 
1 12 2 t
M t M
ωσ σβ
ω
− −
≡ =
∆ ∆
, (3) 
expecting the values for both parameters to be in the 
order of one (analogue to i. to iv.). α is half the 
normalized 1/e width of the amplitude Ψσ(z) of the 
symbol pulses and β of the conjugated pulses. For 
simplicity we assume the pulse relations to be the 
same for PPM and FSK pulses with the result that 
time and frequency will be interchangeable in the 
following calculations. Further, we consider perfect 
single photon sources and do not consider any noise 
so that each pulse is undistorted and contains exactly 
one photon. Because there is only one photon per 
pulse, there is no ambiguity in the determination of 
the received symbol. Classical PPM systems 
generally have dead times between each symbol [17], 
thus we neglect inter-symbol interference.  
It is convenient to define the pulse and bin positions 
at this stage. With i = [1, M] the centers of PPM (resp. 
FSK) symbol pulses, normalized to ∆t (resp. ∆ω), are 
defined as 
 ( ) 1
2
M
c i i
+
= − . (4) 
We assume rectangular bins for Bob and Eve, since it 
is easy to calculate, but also since it prevents 
additional errors. Each bin is defined by its lower 
blow(j) and upper bound bup(j) which we normalize to 
∆t (resp. ∆ω) for time (resp. frequency):  
 ( )low 1
2
for 1
1 for 2,...,
j
b j
j M j M
−∞ =
=  − − =
 (5) 
 ( )
1
2
up
for 1,..., 1
for 
j Mj M
b j
j M
= −−
= 
=+∞
 (6) 
Outer bins (i.e. j = 1 or M) are considered infinitely 
wide in order to maintain all photons. Fig. 2 shows 
the bin and symbol pulse positions for M = 4. The 
part of the pulse which spills in neighboring bins is 
called spill region. 
 
Fig. 2: Definition of bins for M = 4. Each symbol is 
associated to a symbol pulse located in a given bin. Bins, 
are defined in the time and frequency domains by their 
lower and upper bounds blow(j) and bup(j). The centers of 
the symbol pulses sent by the sender Alice are given by 
c(i). As an example a pulse sent in the 2nd bin is shown. 
The spill regions, namely the regions which spill in other 
bins, are displayed in gray. 
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2.2 Mutual information 
One tool for evaluating a QKD protocol is the mutual 
information. For one basis the mutual information of 
one qu-N-it in bits is 
 
,
, , 2
1 1
( , )
( , ) log
( ) ( )
M M
S R
S R S R
s r S R
P s r
I P s r
P s P r= =
′ 
′ ′=  ′ ′ 
∑∑ , (7) 
where M is the number of symbols, s is a symbol out 
of the alphabet S representing the sender and r is a 
symbol out of the alphabet R representing the 
receiver. s out of  S is replaced by a out of A for Alice 
being the sender and r out of R is replaced by b out of 
B for the receiver being Bob and e out of E for it 
being Eve. P’S,R(s,r) is the joint probability of the 
sender sending the s
th
 and the receiver receiving the 
r
th
 symbol. P’S(s) (resp. P’R(r)) is the probability of 
the sender sending (resp. the receiver receiving) the 
s
th
 (resp. r
th
) symbol. Up to N = log2(M) bits per 
photon are possible. In this paper we want to calculate 
the mutual information considering that two bases are 
used with equal probability and with symbols 1 to M 
being time symbols and M +1 to 2M being frequency 
symbols.  
The formula for the mutual information needs to be 
modified, because only half of the 2M symbols can be 
used to create a secret key (only one basis is used at a 
time), so  
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M M
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= =
= =
 
= − 
 
 
= −  
 
∑∑
∑∑
(8) 
which still results in up to N = log2(2M) – 1 = log2(M) 
bits of information and can be rewritten with the 
relation PS,R(s,r) = PR|S(r|s)PS(s), where PR|S(r|s) is the 
conditional probability. 
PS and PR are vectors with the 2M entries PS(s) resp. 
PR(r). Analogously PR|S(r|s) is an entry in column s 
and row r of the 2M×2M matrix PR|S representing the 
transmission from the sender to receiver. PR|S can be 
interpreted as follows: the columns represent which 
symbol a receiver will measure depending on the sent 
symbol represented by the rows. The conditional-
probability matrices PR|S will be created in the 
following section. The probability of receiving the 
different symbols can be calculated with 
 
|R R S S=P P P , (9) 
assuming that Alice sends every symbol of both bases 
with the same probability, i.e. PA(a) = 1/(2M) for 
every a, PB(b) and PE(e) can be calculated. 
2.3 Conditional probability for Bob 
Because of the sifting process Bob will always be in 
the correct basis with respect to Alice. We begin with 
assuming both being in the PPM basis and (as 
mentioned earlier) perfectly rectangular filters of 
width ∆t for Bob: 
   
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
up
low
up
low
correct
| |
2
2
t
b r c a t
R A
b r c a t
b r c a t
b r c a t
t t
P r a t dt
t
dt
σρ
φ
σ σ
− ∆
− ∆
− ∆
− ∆
=
 
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 
∫
∫
, (10) 
and with the substitution t = ∆t x one finds 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
up
low
up
low
correct
|
2
| 2
2 2
2 .
b r c a
R A
b r c a
t t
b r c a
b r c a
t tx
P r a dx
x
dx
φ
σ σ
φ
α α
−
−
−
−
 ∆ ∆
=  
 
 =  
 
∫
∫
(11) 
With a similar substitution one finds the same for 
Alice and Bob being in the frequency domain. Thus 
considering both bases we get 
   
correct
| ,Bob
| correct
, |
0
0
B A M M
B A
M M B A
 
=   
 
P
P
P
 (12) 
where 0M,M represents M×M zero-matrices. 
2.4 Conditional probability for Eve 
Eve uses rectangular filters of width ∆t in one basis 
where each filter output forwards the photons to a 
second set of rectangular filters of width ∆ω in the 
other basis whose outputs forwards the photons to M
2
 
detectors. Eve measuring in the PPM basis first when 
Alice sent in the PPM basis is analogous to Alice 
sending to Bob described by (11). The filtering taking 
place in the wrong basis is not relevant here. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that Eve always first 
filters in the PPM basis. Thus Eve’s and Alice’s bases 
differ when Alice sends FSK pulses, yielding a 
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conditional probability for Eve’s detected symbols of   
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( )
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1
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|
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With the substitution t = ∆t x one gets 
   
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
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low
up
low
wrong
| 1 1
2
| 2
2 2
2 .
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E A
b e
b e
b e
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 (14) 
After the first filter the pulses will be broadened but 
still centered at the same position. Eve wants to 
preserve as much information as possible in the 
frequency domain without losing information for her 
time measurement, thus rectangular filters of width ∆t 
are already the optimal choice. Applying the Fourier 
transform, noted ( )( )ωF , to conjugated FSK pulses 
truncated in the time domain by the first filter  leads 
to a modified Gaussian function in the frequency 
domain described by 
     
( ) ( )1
2
2
1
( )f f
i t
f
t
g t H
t
t t
H e dt
t
ω
ω ω
ω
σ
ω ψ ω
φ
σ
σ
π
−
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   
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F
 (15) 
with the rectangular filter function being 
   
low up1     for  ( ) ( )
0     otherwise.
f
t tt
H
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t
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 ∆
< <

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


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(16) 
With the substitution t = xσω
-1
 and ω = wσω we get 
     ( )
2
( )
2
1
.iwx
f f
g w x H e dx
M x
φ
β
π
+∞ −
−∞
 =  
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(17) 
Consequently 
  ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )nd up
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2  correct
|
1
|
M b e c a
E A f
b e c a
f
P e a g d
ω
ω
ω ω
− ∆
− ∆
=
= ∑∫ ɶ ɶ ,(18) 
with the sum over all the truncated pulses going 
through all time-filter outputs. Eve will save the 
information received in the time and frequency 
domain until the sifting process after which she only 
keeps the information about the announced bases. 
Consequently the conditional probability matrix for 
Eve after the sifting process is 
   
nd
correct
| ,Eve
| 2  correct
, |
0
0
E A M M
E A
M M E A
 
 =
 
 
P
P
P
. (19) 
3 Optimal pulse widths 
3.1 Symbol pulses 
In the assumed intercept/resend attack Eve measures a 
fraction ε of the photons sent by Alice and then 
resends a photon for each measured one.  
With the conditional probabilities calculated in 
Section 2.3 and 2.4 and the corresponding mean 
probabilities we can calculate IA,B and IA,E from 
(8). Alice sends every symbol with the same 
probability, thus PA(a) = 1/(2M) for a out of A. Bob 
does not know which photons exactly Eve attacked 
on. Thus Bob’s probability and conditional 
probability is the mean of Eve attacking and not 
attacking: 
  ( ) no attack attack| | |1B A B A B Aε ε= − +P P P , (20) 
 ( ) no attack attack1B B Bε ε= − +P P P . (21) 
If Eve is not attacking
no attack
| |B A B A
=P P and
no attack
|B B A A
=P P P , see (12). If Eve is attacking, she 
resends photon symbol depending on what she has 
measured. Eve gets information of both bases. We 
assume Eve sends in the basis in which she 
potentially has more information, hence in which she 
filters first (here in the PPM basis). Eve wants to 
mimic Alice, so she uses the same pulse relations as 
her.  
If Eve attacks, there are two possibilities: Firstly, Eve 
is in the correct basis compared to Alice and 
subsequently resends a photon according to what she 
has measured. Thus the symbol probability matrix for 
Bob is ( )2correct|B AP  (the square represents the matrix 
product with itself). Secondly, Eve is in the wrong 
basis compared to Alice, consequently Bob will be in 
the wrong basis compared to Eve. Thus the 
conditional probability for him is
wrong basis
|B A
P . Both 
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scenarios happen with equal probability, so the 
conditional probability of Bob if Eve attacks is 
 
mean
| ,attack
| mean
, |
01
02
B A M M
B A
M M B A
 
=   
 
P
P
P
 (22) 
with ( )2mean correct wrong| | |B A B A B A= +P P P . Furthermore we get
attack attack
|B B A A
=P P P  for Bob’s measurement outcome. 
With (8) we can now calculate the mutual information 
of Alice and Bob: 
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, |
1 1
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2
|
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log 1.
M M
A B B A
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A
B
I P b a
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= =
=
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 
∑∑
 (23) 
Eve’s measurement outcome is 
  
Eve
|E E A A
=P P P . (24) 
She only gets information when she is eavesdropping, 
thus the mutual information between Alice and Eve is 
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, |
1 1
Eve
|
2
|
|
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= =
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∑∑
 (25) 
The secret capacity, thus the upper bound for the 
number of secret bits per photon, for infinite keys (see 
for example [18]) is 
  
,B , ,B ,
,B ,
for  
0 for  
A A E A A E
A A E
I I I I
C
I I
− >
= 
≤
. (26) 
Note that for M = 2 the secret capacity is the secret 
fraction as used for example in [18]. C can become 
larger than one for M > 2 and represents the secret 
bits per photon, thus is rather a capacity than a 
fraction of bits.
1
  
The parameters of our protocol should be chosen such 
that C is maximized. Fig. 3 provides an optimization 
                                                           
1
The secret key rate S = KC of a realization of the 
protocol can be derived from the sifted key rate K and 
C depending on α and β and matching 
( ) ( )|QSER 1 1/ 2 trace B AM= − P . For the correlation 
between QSER and quantum bit error rate see [19]. 
as a function of α and β. C strongly depends on α but 
hardly on β (for α being near the optimum).  
In the following section we will see how to still find 
an optimal value of β for more general eavesdropping 
strategies. 
 
Fig. 3:  (Color online) Secret capacity C for M = 4 as a 
function of the normalized pulse width α and conjugate 
pulse width β. 
3.2 Conjugated pulses 
In the described intercept/resend attack Eve does not 
exploit the imperfect overlap of time and frequency 
symbols, i.e. the partial available information on the 
used basis. One example of such a strategy is 
described in [15]. Such an attack benefits from the 
capability of Eve to perform a basis-dependent attack 
which is only possible if she can discriminate the 
bases. This is mainly depending on the conjugated-
pulse overlap with the symbol pulses. 
In [12] the security of CV-TF-QKD is shown for a 
certain pulse relation by showing that the equality 
 ( ) ( )
t
t t
ωσ σ
ρ ρ=∑ ∑  (27) 
holds for the sum over all possible pulses. In the DV 
case this equation cannot be fulfilled. Our approach is 
to quantify the deviation from (27) by evaluating the 
difference ( ) ( )
t
t t
ωσ σ
ρ ρ−∑ ∑ , which in our case is 
not equal to zero.  Considering all pulses, the 
difference can be written as 
0
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( )1
1
1
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t
M
s
M
U t s t
t dt
ω
α σ
σ
β ρ
ρ −
=
 +  ≡ + − ∆    
−
∑∫
 (28)  
Ua(β) can then be minimized numerically in order to 
find and optimum normalized conjugated pulse width 
βopt. 
3.3 Secret key rate 
In the following, the results of maximizing (26) and 
subsequently minimizing (28) are presented and 
discussed. 
C, αopt and βopt are plotted over M in the top of Fig. 4  
for different ε. αopt approaches a value between 0.4 
and 0.6 and βopt a value of roughly 0.7 for a higher 
number M of symbols per basis. In the bottom of 
Fig. 4 the secret capacity C is plotted as a function of 
M. While C becomes smaller with a higher fraction ε 
of eavesdropped photons it increases with a higher M. 
For ε ≥ 0.9 the capacity vanishes for all M. It is 
obvious that, when no eavesdropper is present, the 
symbol pulses should be as narrow as possible to 
prevent spill-region induced bit errors. With a higher 
eavesdropping fraction ε the optimum symbol pulses 
get wider to prevent Eve from obtaining information. 
The conjugated pulses follow the symbol pulses in 
width to increase the overlap.  
 
Fig. 4:  (Color online) Top: αopt and βopt. Bottom: the 
secret capacity (secret bits per photon) C for different M 
and ε calculated with the optimal pulse widths αopt and 
βopt. 
If ε approaches zero, α gets small which leads to 
C ≈ log2M. Comparing that to QKD protocols like 
BB84 (C ≈ 1 for low errors), TF-QKD can have a 
tremendous advantage for repetition rates much 
smaller than 1/∆t. For a 100 MHz repetition rate 
M = 256 PPM-symbols fit (∆t ≈ 39 ps) which leads to 
up to eight times higher secret key rates (See dashed 
lines in Fig. 4, assuming M = 256 FSK-symbols). 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper we provided a detailed analysis of the 
DV-TF-QKD protocol. We show that symbols with 
infinitesimal width are not optimal, quite contrarily a 
certain width is preferable, which contradicts [15].  
We have discussed that a complete optimization of an 
even slightly more advanced protocol against all 
possible attacks under realistic conditions is very 
challenging. Our analysis suggests that efforts on full 
numerical assessment of QKD protocols are 
rewarding.   
By a numerical approach assuming an 
intercept/resend attack and a high overlap between 
pulses of both bases the optimal pulse widths were 
calculated. Although a security proof against general 
attacks is still missing, these pulse widths can be used 
as a good estimation on how to form the bases in a 
real implementation of DV-TF-QKD. Additionally 
the secret bits per photon were calculated for different 
parameters under the assumptions above. Further it 
was shown that a higher number of symbols per basis 
increases the secret key rate. 
Extending the implementation for M = 2 [13] to 
higher M would be possible by cascading the used 
time and frequency filters or by using detectors which 
can measure time respective frequency directly. 
The DV-TF-QKD protocol is a promising QKD 
protocol, especially regarding the high number of 
possible bits per photon for lower repetition-rates. 
Compared to its CV counterpart it is easier to 
implement mostly using off-the-shelf telecom 
components. PPM and FSK rely on standard 
techniques in classical communication, which makes 
this protocol well suited for both free-space and fiber 
based QKD.  
This work has been funded by the German Research 
Foundation (DFG) within the CRC 787, project C2. 
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